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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 





RALPH IVYNFIELD FORSHEE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant appeals from a jury verdict finding 
him guilty of Unlawful Distribution for Value of a Controlled 
Substance as proscribed by Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1953), as 
amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant was tried by a jury on February 7, 
1979, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. The trial was presided over by 
the Honorable James S. Sawaya. The jury found appellant 
guilty of Unlawful Distribution of a Controlled Substance 
contrary to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1953) 
as amended. Pursuant to the verdict of che jury, Judge Saway~ 
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sentenced appellant to imprisonment in the Utah State Prison 
for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment and 
sentence of the court below. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On April 21, 1978, a Deputy Sheriff of the Salt 
Lake County Sheriff's Department, while working as an 
undercover agent, met a confidential informant in order to 
meet a third person to purchase narcotics (T.l2-13). The 
confidential informant took the deputy to a duplex near 
3100 South 3450 West in Salt Lake County and the two walked 
into the residence (T.l4). Once inside, the informant 
introduced the deputy to appellant and Mrs. Forshee, 
appellant's ex-wife (T.l4). In court, Deputy Whittaker 
identified the appellant and Mrs. Forshee as the persons 
whom he met that evening (T.l4-15). Mrs. Forshee then 
pointed to a baggie on the kitchen table which Deputy 
Whittaker testified appeared to be marijuana (T.l6). 
Deputy Whittaker and the appellant, after discussing 
briefly the quanitity and quality of the contents of the 
baggie, agreed to make the sale for fifty dollars (T.l7). 
The deputy paid appellant, took the baggie, and left the 
residence (T.l7). The confidential informant did not 
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leave with the deputy, and Deputy Whittaker testified that 
the informant lived at the residence in which the trans-
action took place (T.l8). 
Approximately one hour after the transaction, 
Deputy lvhittaker met Deputy Randall Anderson in the Valley 
Fair Mall parking lot and transferred to Deputy Anderson the 
baggie of marijuana (T.lB-19,40-41). Deputy Anderson 
delivered the marijuana to Joseph Tyree, a toxicologist for 
the Salt Lake City-County Health Department (T.41,43). 
Joseph Tyree, after conducting two tests on the contents 
of the baggie, concluded that the substance was marijuana 
(T. 48). 
Deputy Whittaker was instructed not to disclose 
the name of the confidential informant at the trial (T.l3). 
Appellant moved before trial to dismiss the information 
based upon the state's failure to disclose the name of the 
confidential informant as requested in a bill of particulars. 
This motion was denied (T.S) since the name of the confidential 
informant would be irrelevant if appellant actually made the 
sale to the officer. 
Appellant's defense presented at trial consisted 
of his own testimony, the testimony of his ex-wife, Vickie 
Forshee, and that of his new girlfriend, Val Densley. 
-3-
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Appellant testified that at the time of the alleged 
transaction, his ex-wife was living with a Richard Garrett, 
whom appellant and his trial counsel believed to be the 
confidential informant (T.53,R.27). Since Richard Garrett 
is no longer working as an undercover informant for the 
Salt Lake County Sheriff's Department, the state can now 
disclose that he was the confidential informant involved 
in the transaction at issue in this case. 
Appellant testified that the transaction had 
not taken place, and that the first time he had seen 
Deputy Whittaker was at appellant's preliminary hearing 
(T.54). The essence of appellant's story was that Richard 
Garrett and Deputy Whittaker must have fabricated the 
charge against appellant (T.56). Appellant admitted on 
cross-examination that he had previously been convicted 
on a marijuana charge (T.60). 
Appellant's ex-wife also testified that she 
had never seen Deputy Whittaker before the preliminary 
hearing for appellant (T.64). She also established that 
Richard Garrett had been living with her at the time, that 
Garrett hated appellant, and that Garrett was capa~le of 
setting appellant up to commit the crime (T.63,66,67). 
Finally, appellant's girlfriend testified that she had 
accompanied appellant every time appellant went to see 
his children at the residence occupied by appellant's 
-4- I .. 
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ex-wife and Richard Garrett and had never seen Deputy 
Whittaker before (T.72). The jury discredited the 
testimony of the defense witnesses and returned a verdict 
of guilty against appellant (T.9l). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO 
COMPEL DISCLOSURE OF THE IDENTITY 
OF THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT DOES 
NOT CONSTITUTE REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Appellant's sole assignment of error is that 
the trial court refused to compel the state to disclose 
to appellant the identity of the confidential informant 
who arranged the transaction between Deputy Whittaker and 
appellant. Appellant requested such information in a 
Motion for Bill of Particulars (R.9-l0). The state refused 
to supply the identity of the informant because, first, the 
informant was still being used in undercover narcotics 
investigations and disclosure might prejudice those 
investigations, and, second, the informant was not a 
participant in the transaction between appellant and 
Deputy Whittaker (R.l0-12). Appellant now avers that 
under the rule established by the United States Supreme 
Court in Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957), and 
under Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, it was error 
for the trial court not to compel disclosure of the identity 
-5-
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of the informant as an exception to the government's 
informer privilege. 
In Roviaro, supra, the defendant was convicted 
of knowingly possessing and transporting unlawfully imported 
heroin. The defendant demanded disclosure of the identity 
of a confidential informant who allegedly bought heroin 
from the defendant and was the only other witness to the 
alleged transaction. The government invoked its informer's 
privilege and the trial court sustained the failure to 
disclose. The Supreme Court recognized the purpose of the 
privilege: 
The purpose of the privilege is the 
furtherance and protection of the public 
interest in law enforcement. The privilege 
recognizes the obligation of citizens to 
communicate their knowledge of the commis-
sion of crimes to law enforcement officials, 
and by preserving their anonymity, encourages 
them to perform that obligation. 
353 u.s. 53, 59. 
The court identified three exceptions to the 
privilege of non-disclosure as: 
1) The contents of communications 
between the informant and others are not 
privileged; 
2) Once the identity of the informant 
"has been disclosed to those who would have 
cause to resent the communication, the 
privilege is no longer applicable;" Roviaro, 
supra at p. 60, and 
3) "Where the disclosure of an 
informer's identity, or of the contents 
of his communication, is relevant and 
helpful to the defense of an accused, or 
-6-
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is essential to a fair determination 
of a cause, the privilege must give way." 
Roviaro, supra at pp. 60-61. 
In rejecting any fixed rule when nondisclosure 
is erroneous, the Court stated: 
The problem is one that calls for 
balancing the public interest in protecting 
the free flow of information against the 
individual's right to prepare his defense. 
Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure 
erroneous must depend on the particular 
circumstances of each case, taking into 
consideration the crine charged, the 
possible defenses, the possible significance 
of the informer's testimony, and other 
relevant factors. 
353 U.S. 53, 62. The court emphasized the third exception 
to the privilege in holding that under the facts of 
Roviaro, the failure to require disclosure was error: 
This is a case where the Government's 
informer was the sole participant, other 
than the accused, in the transaction charged. 
The informer was the only witness in a 
position to amplify or contradict the testimony 
of government witnesses. . . We conclude that, 
under the circumstances, the trial court 
committed prejudicial error in permitting the 
Government to withhold the identity of its 
undercover employee •.. 
353 u.s. 53, 64-65. 
The case at bar is factually distinguished from 
Roviaro in that here the transaction in which the marijuana 
was exchanged took place between Deputy Whittaker and the 
appellant, not between the informant and the appellant. In 
addition, the informant here was not the sole witness, 
besides appellant, to the transaction. Appellant's ex-wife, 
-7-
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Vickie Forshee, was also present and testified at trial 
to bolster appellant's defense. Thus, Roviaro does not 
determine the issues in this case. 
Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
recognizes the privilege to withhold disclosure of a 
confidential informant's identity, subject only to two 
exceptions: (a) where the identity of the informant has 
been "otherwise disclosed," and (b) where disclosure is 
essential to assure a fair determination of the issues. 
These exceptions are two of those recognized in Roviaro, 
supra. 
As to the first exception ((a) above), the 
language of Roviaro shows that the disclosure referred to 
goes beyond mere knowledge of the appellant or his counsel 
of the identity of the informer. The Supreme Court stated: 
[o]nce the identity of the 
informer has been disclosed to those who 
would have cause to resent the communication, 
the privilege is no longer applicable. 
353 U.S. 53, 60 (emphasis added). In the case at bar, the 
class of persons who would resent communication by the 
confidential informant includes those who are the subject 
of investigations in which the informant may participate. 
Such broad disclosure was not made in this case. In fact, 
the state did not "disclose" the identity of the informant 
-8-
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even to the appellant. Appellant merely alleges that he 
felt Richard Garrett was the informant, and since his 
identity was known, disclosure should have been made 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 12). This allegation fails to 
recognize that the state's purpose in invoking the 
privilege was to protect the confidentiality of the 
informant as to other persons under investigation, not 
as to the appellant. Thus, this exception does not apply 
to the instant case. 
Most of the cases decided after Roviaro have 
focused upon exception (b) in Rule 36, relating to 
situations where disclosure is relevant and helpful to the 
accused's defense or is necessary for a fair determination 
of the issues. The courts have uniformly recognized: 
An appellant seeking to overcome the 
state's policy of protecting an informant's 
identity, has the burden of proving that the 
informant is likely to have evidence bearing 
on the merits of the case ... His burden 
extends only to a showing that, in view of 
the evidence, the informer would be a material 
witness on the issue of guilt which might 
result in exoneration and that nondisclosure 
of his identity would deprive the defendant 
of a fair trial. 
State v. Tuell, 541 P.2d 1142, 1145 (Ariz. 1975). In the 
present case, appellant has not made any showing as to 
how the informant's testimony would have been material to 
the issue of appellant's guilt. In addition, as will be 
-9-
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more fully developed infra, appellant could easily have 
subpoenaed the person he felt was the informant as a 
witness if the informant's testimony would have helped 
appellant's defense. As the Supreme Court of Colorado 
recently stated: 
. the accused is required to 
make at least a minimal affirmative 
showing of the need for disclosure; and 
.. a defendant's mere unsupported 
assertion that he desires disclosure is 
not enough. A defendant's speculations, 
without more, will not support a conclu-
sion that the informant would be of any 
substantial assistance in his defense. 
People v. Langford, Colo., 550 P.2d 329 (1976). See also 
State v. Bankhead, 514 P. 2d 800 (Utah 1973). Appellant alle:-
only that the informant might have assisted in developing a:. 
entrapment defense or might have helped establish that the 
transaction never occurred. The entrapment defense was 
apparently abandoned by appellant in favor of his defense 
that the transaction did not take place. As to the latter 
defense, the informant's testimony would have been merely 
cumulative to that offered by the three defense witnesses, 
assuming that testimony would be favorable to the defense o-
all. Given the animosity between Richard Garrett and 
appellant, and the remote possibility that Deputy Whittaker 
and Garrett somehow fabricated the charge, it is incredible 
that the informer's testimony would have been favorable 
to the defense. 
-10-
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In the case of People v. Marquez, Colo., 546 P.2d 
482 (1976), the Colorado Supreme Court fully analyzed the 
post-Roviaro case law and set forth the factors which must 
be weighed as part of the Roviaro balancing test. Those 
factors include: 
. whether the informant was an 
eyewitness and earwitness to the criminal 
transaction and whether the informer 
himself is available or could, in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence, be 
made available; whether other witnesses 
to the transaction are in a position to 
testify; the likelihood that-the testimony 
of the informer will vary significantly 
from that of other available or potentially 
available witnesses; whether the defendant 
himself knows the identify of the in-
formant or could without undue effort 
discover his identify; whether the informant 
was deeply or only peripherally involved 
in the criminal transaction. 
546 P.2d 482, 485. In Marquez, the court held that since 
there was another witness to the alleged sale of heroin 
by the appellant who could have been called to support the 
defense and since it appeared that appellant knew the identity 
of the informant, the public interest outweighed the interest 
of the appellant. 
Applying the Marquez factors to the instant case, 
the public interest in confidentiality outweighs the 
appellant's interest in disclosure. First, it is not clear 
whether Richard Garrett was actually an eye-or earwitness to 
-11-
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sale transaction between appellant and Deputy Whittaker. 
Since appellant denies that any such transaction occurred, 
whether the informant was a witness to the transaction or 
not, this information would not have helped the defense. 
Second, Mr. Garrett was only peripherally involved in the 
transaction. He did not receive the marijuana from 
appellant (as was the case in Roviaro) , but merely introduced 
Deputy Whittaker to the appellant. Third, Richard Garrett 
was not the only witness besides the appellant who could 
"amplify or contradict the testimony of government witnesses, 
Roviaro, supra at 64-65. As in Marquez, there was another 
witness to the transaction, Vickie Forshee, appellant's 
ex-wife, who could and did testify in appellant's favor. 
This establishes that the necessity of the informant's 
availability to the defendant in Roviaro was not present 
here. 
Fourth, any possible testimony given by the 
informant was not likely to have varied significantly from 
the testimony of Deputy Whittaker. Such testimony could ha:: 
have been helpful to appellant's defense. If Mr. Garrett hac 
testified that no transaction took place, his testimony wou~ 
have been merely cumulative and thus not substantially 
helpful to appellant. Finally, and most importantly, it 15 
clear from the record that appellant in fact knew the 
identify of the informant (R. 27, T. 25). Nevertheless, 
-1~?~ ____________________ ........ 
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appellant apparently made no significant effort to locate and/or 
subpoena the person he suspected to be the informant to 
elicit his testimony. Appellant's failure to call Richard 
Garrett as a witness is inconsistent with his present 
argument that Garrett's testimony would have been relevant 
and helpful to his defense. 
In the recent case of Lopez v. State, 574 S.W. 2d 
563 (Tex. Cr. App. 1978), a case factually similar to the 
instant one, the court held that although normally disclosure 
would be required if the informant played a prominent part 
in bringing the offense about or was a material witness, where 
the defendant and his counsel know the identity of the 
informer and there is no indication that the defendant could 
not have produced the informant as a witness or that his 
testimony is unavailable, it is not error to refuse to compel 
disclosure. To the same effect is State v. Hull, 487 P.2d 
1314 (Mont. 1971). In light of the factors discussed 
immediately above, respondent submits that the Roviaro 
balance should be struck in favor of the state's exercise of 
the privilege to protect the confidentiality of the informant. 
Thus, it was not error for the trial court to permit the 
state to withhold the identity of the confidential informant. 
-13-
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that appellant has failed 
to show that disclosure of the identity of the state's 
confidential informant would have been relevant and helpful 
to his defense or essential to a fair determination of 
the issues of this case. Thus, appellant's conviction and 
sentence should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSFN 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARL0\'7 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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